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The Use of Mandamus to Compel a Zoning
Ordinance: Chanceford Aviation Properties v.
Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION -
CONSTRUCTION AS MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY - MANDAMUS -
ZONING ORDINANCE - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that the language of the Airport Zoning Act requires a municipal-
ity with a public airport to enact and enforce an airport hazard
zoning ordinance.
Chanceford Aviation Props. v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 923 A.2d 1099 (Pa. 2007).
To benefit her public airport, Loretta Baublitz sought a court
order compelling Chanceford Township to enact certain legisla-
tion.' She contended that a state statute, enacted over twenty
years ago, mandated such action by the township. 2 Her case de-
pended upon the statutory interpretation of the legislature's use of
the word "shall."3
On five acres of land situated in Chanceford Township, York
County, Pennsylvania, Levere Baublitz (Mr. Baublitz) owned and
operated a private airport. 4 The enactment of the 1979 Chance-
ford Township zoning ordinance situated the airport in an agricul-
tural zone, 5 but the airport continued to operate as a pre-existing
non-conforming use. 6 After acquiring a license from the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Aviation (Penn-
1. Chanceford Aviation Props. v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 923 A.2d 1099,
1102 (Pa. 2007).
2. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1102.
3. Id. at 1104.
4. Id. at 1101. Under the Aviation Code, a "private airport" is defined as "an airport
which is privately owned and which is not open or intended to be open to the public." 74
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102 (West 1993).
5. Baublitz v. Chanceford Twp. Rd. of Supervisors, 865 A.2d 975, 976 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005).
6. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1101. A "pre-existing non-conforming use" is defined as a
"land use that is impermissible under current zoning restrictions but that is allowed be-
cause the use existed lawfully before the restrictions took effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1577 (8th ed. 2004).
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DOT), Mr. Baublitz operated his airport as a public airport. 7 In
1984, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Airport Zoning
Act8 (AZA or Act), which required that state municipalities in
which a public airport is situated adopt an airport hazard 9 zoning
ordinance. 10 Within a year of enacting AZA, the Pennsylvania
legislature notified each township containing a public airport of
the specifications mandated by AZA. 11 When no action had been
taken by Chanceford Township by 1991, Mr. Baublitz took it upon
himself to inform the township of its obligations. 12 Although
meetings were held on the issue in both 1993 and 1994, the town-
ship took no further steps towards establishing an ordinance to
meet the requirements of AZA. 13
Loretta Baublitz (Mrs. Baublitz) took over the airport after her
husband's death in 2000 with the receipt of a letter of continued
operation issued by PennDOT. 14 However, PennDOT refused to
issue a new public airport license until Baublitz's airport complied
with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and the
township adopted an airport hazard zone. 15 Two years later, Mrs.
Baublitz, like her husband, requested that the township meet its
requirements under AZA by adopting an airport zoning ordi-
7. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1101. The Aviation Code defines "public airport" as "an
airport which is either publicly or privately owned and which is open to the public." 74 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102 (West 1993).
8. 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912 (West 1993). This statute provides:
In order to prevent the creation or establishment of airport hazards, every mu-
nicipality having an airport hazard area within its territorial limits shall
adopt, administer and enforce, under the police power and in the manner and
upon the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and in applicable zoning law
unless clearly inconsistent with this subchapter, airport zoning regulations for
such airport hazard area. The regulations may divide the area into zones and,
within the zones, specify the land uses permitted and regulate and restrict the
height to which structures may be erected or objects of natural growth may be
allowed to grow. A municipality which includes an airport hazard area created
by the location of a public airport is required to adopt, administer and enforce
zoning ordinances pursuant to this subchapter if the existing comprehensive
zoning ordinance for the municipality does not provide for the land uses per-
mitted and regulate and restrict the height to which structures may be erected
or objects of natural growth may be allowed to grow in an airport hazard area.
Id. § 5912(a).
9. The Aviation Code defines "airport hazard" as "[a]ny structure or object, natural or
manmade, or use of land which obstructs the airspace required for flight of aircraft in land-
ing or taking off at an airport or is otherwise hazardous to the landing or taking off of air-
craft." Id. § 5102.
10. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1101-02.
11. Id. at 1101.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1102.
14. Id.
15. Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 976-77.
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nance. 16 Again the township held a series of meetings, but by
2003, no such ordinance had been adopted. 17
Mrs. Baublitz initiated suit against the Chanceford Township
Board of Supervisors in July 2003, petitioning the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of York County for a writ of mandamus' 8 to compel
Chanceford Township to complete its requirements under AZA by
adopting an airport hazard zoning ordinance. 19 After both parties
moved for summary judgment, the trial court granted Mrs.
Baublitz's motion and issued a writ to compel the enactment of an
airport hazard zoning ordinance. 20 The trial court reached its con-
clusions by interpreting the language of AZA as a legislative man-
date for the creation of an airport hazard zoning ordinance.
21
The township appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania and argued that the language of AZA is directory rather
than mandatory. 22 After indicating the significance of the Act's
title, the commonwealth court found that the effect of AZA was a
grant of power rather than a legislative command. 23 The majority
found that the existing Chanceford Township zoning ordinance
24
16. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1102.
17. Id.
18. A "writ of mandamus" is defined as "a writ issued by a superior court to compel a
lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties cor-
rectly." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004).
19. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1102; Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 976-77.
20. Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 977-78.
21. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1102.
22. Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 977.
23. Id. at 978.
24. CHANCEFORD, PA., ORDINANCE § 411 (1979). This ordinance provides:
Where indicated as permitted by special exception, this use is permitted subject
to the following:
a. Lot Area: ten (10) acres minimum.
b. The approach zone to any of the proposed runway landing strips shall
be in accordance with the regulations of applicable Federal and/or State
agencies.
c. There shall be no existing flight obstructions such as towers, chimneys
or other tall structures or natural obstructions outside of the airport and
located within the proposed approach zones.
d. Any building, hangar or structure shall be located a sufficient distance
away from the landing strip in accordance with the recommendations of
applicable Federal and/or State agencies.
e. Building heights in airport approach zones shall be limited to provide a
clear glide path from the end of the usable landing strip. The glide path
shall be a plane surface laid out in accordance with the operating charac-
teristics of the aircraft for which the airport is designed. The first five
hundred (500) feet of the glide path shall be wholly within the airport
property.
f. The facility must be permitted under applicable PAA and FAA regula-
tions.
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regulating structures adjacent to airport grounds permitted as a
special exception sufficed to meet the requirements of AZA. 25 Mrs.
Baublitz appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but
prior to oral arguments, Chanceford Aviation Properties (Chance-
ford Aviation) acquired title to the airport and replaced Mrs.
Baublitz as the appellant.26
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to decide
three issues: (1) whether AZA requires the township to enact an
airport hazard zoning ordinance, (2) whether section 411 of the
Township Zoning Ordinance satisfies the requirements of AZA,
and (3) whether a mandamus suffices to order a municipality to
adopt an ordinance required by the legislature.
27
In an opinion written by Justice Eakin, the court reversed the
decision of the commonwealth court, finding that the language of
AZA required a municipality with a public airport to enact and
enforce an airport hazard zoning ordinance. 28 When reviewing the
second issue, the court again disagreed with the commonwealth
court, deciding that the existing zoning ordinance did not comply
with AZA because the ordinance's scope covered operating an air-
port as a special exception. 29 On the third issue, Justice Eakin
responded that a mandamus action may be used to order a mu-
nicipality to comply with AZA's requirements where notice was
given and no action to comply had been taken. 30
In deciding whether AZA mandated the adoption of an airport
hazard zoning ordinance, the majority relied upon the rules of
statutory construction to interpret the Act in accordance with the
legislature's intent.31 Under these rules, words that are clear and
unambiguous serve as the best evidence of the legislature's in-
tent. 32 Upon examining the language of AZA, the majority focused
on the use of the word "shall."33 The court stated that past cases
had generally defined the word "shall" as a legislative mandate.
34
g. If in the Conservation Zone or Agricultural Zone, the provisions of Sec-
tions 206.9 and 207.9 shall apply to the site location and to reduce the
number of dwelling units permitted on the tract where the use is located.
Id.
25. Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 978.
26. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1103.
27. Id. at 1103-04.
28. Id. at 1101, 1106, 1109.
29. Id. at 1106-07.
30. Id. at 1108.
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Chanceford Aviation argued that "shall" should be interpreted
as mandatory because the language of the act is clear and unam-
biguous. 35 It also argued that a mandatory interpretation was
consistent with the purpose of AZA.
36
Conversely, in arguing that the legislature intended only a di-
rectory act, the Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors fo-
cused on the heavy burden that Chanceford Aviation's interpreta-
tion would place on municipalities in the state. 37 The township
also argued that a reversal of the commonwealth court's decision
would benefit the airport at the expense of a significant number of
adjacent lots.3 8 In support of the township's argument, the Penn-
sylvania State Association of Township Supervisors (PSATS) ad-
vocated in their amicus curiae 39 brief for a directory interpretation
based on AZA's ambiguous language. 40 By examining AZA in or-
der to identify the legislature's purpose, Justice Eakin found that,
in enacting AZA, the legislature intended the act as mandatory,
noting the use of the words "shall" and "requires."
41
Next the court considered whether the current Chanceford
Township Zoning ordinance met the requirements of AZA. 42 Both
the township and PSATS asserted that the commonwealth court
correctly determined that section 411 of the existing ordinance
fulfilled AZA's obligations by incorporating both state and federal
regulations. 43 In answering the second issue, Justice Eakin relied
on AZA's goal of preventing the creation or establishment of air-
port hazards, and found that section 411's scope was too narrow to
achieve that objective. 44 The existing ordinance regulated land
where an airport would be established as a special exception, 45
rather than a non-conforming use. 46 The ordinance did not com-
35. Id.
36. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.
37. Id. at 1104-05.
38. Id. at 1105.
39. "Amicus curiae" is defined as "a person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who
petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that
person has a strong interest in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed.
2004).
40. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1105.
41. Id. at 1105-06.
42. Id. at 1106-07.
43. Id. at 1107.
44. Id.
45. "Special exception" is defined as "an allowance in a zoning ordinance for special
uses that are considered essential and are not fundamentally incompatible with the origi-
nal zoning regulations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (8th ed. 2004).
46. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1107.
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ply with AZA, because the township failed to demonstrate that
section 411 applied to airport hazard areas in addition to airports
allowed as special exceptions.
47
Finally, the court determined whether a writ of mandamus was
the appropriate remedy to compel enactment of the zoning ordi-
nance. 48 Three arguments were made opposing the use of a man-
damus to force legislative action. 49 According to the township, the
power to enact a zoning ordinance was purely legislative, and
therefore, the judicial remedy of mandamus was inappropriate. 50
Additionally, the township argued that mandamus should not be
granted because it never expressly refused to obey AZA.51 As its
third argument, the township asserted that Chanceford Aviation
could take it upon itself to regulate surrounding airspace by pur-
chasing rights of way or title to adjacent lots or the rights to the
airspace of these lots. 52 Justice Eakin focused on the township's
inaction since receiving notice of AZA's requirements and rejected
the township's arguments. 53 The township's failure to act for over
twenty years exhibited a clear refusal to perform its duty, making
the mandamus action appropriate. 54 Furthermore, AZA com-
mands the compliance of the township rather than that of the
property owner, and therefore, could not be complied with by ac-
tions taken solely by Chanceford Aviation. 55
Justice Saylor filed a dissenting opinion, claiming, in contrast,
that section 411 of the Chanceford Township Ordinance complied
with the requirements of AZA. 56 Although concurring with the
majority's interpretation of AZA as mandatory, he interpreted sec-
tion 411 as regulating heights and objects in airport hazard ar-
eas. 57 Furthermore, the existing ordinance furthered the legisla-
ture's intent to prevent airport hazards, because it provided a spe-
cial exception to allow an airport within a township, subject to cer-
tain conditions. 58 While finding that section 411 generally com-
plied with AZA, Justice Saylor noted that, because the ordinance
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1108-09.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1108.
51. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1108.
52. Id. at 1109.
53. Id. at 1108.
54. Id. at 1108-09.
55. Id.
56. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1109 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1110.
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applied only to special exceptions, additional regulations would be
required to comply with AZA. 59 The dissent realized that the case
sub judice may have presented such a situation because Chance-
ford Aviation's airport functioned as a nonconforming use rather
than a special exception, and therefore, Justice Saylor concluded
that the case should be remanded for further determination of the
applicability of section 411.60
Justice Eakin's opinion relied upon a body of case law dealing
with statutory construction that has evolved over the past cen-
tury. 61 In 1956, the Pennsylvania Superior Court focused on the
distinctions between mandatory and directory statutes in Borough
of Pleasant Hills v. Carroll.62 Pleasant Hills involved the imposi-
tion of a wage tax under the authority of a tax act passed in
1947.63 The tax act required that any subsequent tax passed
must expressly state the tax act as its authority for the imposed
tax. 64 The defendant, Herbert Carroll, argued that since the wage
tax adopted by the Borough of Pleasant Hills (Borough) lacked
such a provision, the tax was invalid.65 The Borough argued that
the lack of the statement did not invalidate the tax since the pro-
vision was merely directory rather than mandatory. 66 The court
noted that the use of the word "shall" generally means the legisla-
ture intended the act to be a mandate, but noted that "shall" may
be interpreted as a directive if indicated by legislative intent.
67
Thus, in order to determine the legislature's intended meaning of
the word "shall," the court studied the act as a whole, its purpose,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104 (majority opinion).
62. 125 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
63. Pleasant Hills, 125 A.2d at 468.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Tax Act of 1947, as amended in 1953, stated:
Every ordinance or resolution which imposes a tax under the authority of this
act shall impose such tax for one year only and shall be passed or adopted, if for
a school district, during the period other school taxes are required by law to be
levied and assessed by such district. Each ordinance and resolution shall state
that it is enacted under the authority of the act of June twenty-fifth, one thou-
sand nine hundred forty-seven and its amendments.
53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2015.2 (West 1953).
66. Pleasant Hills, 125 A.2d at 468.
67. Id. The court stated:
Except when relating to the time of doing something, statutory provisions con-
taining the word shall are usually considered to be mandatory, but it is the in-
tention of the legislature which governs, and this intent is to be ascertained
from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object and the conse-
quences that would result from construing it one way or the other.
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and the effects that both interpretations would yield. 68 The court
held that the legislature intended the act to be directory, and the
failure of the tax to indicate its reliance on the tax act did not in-
validate the tax. 69 Furthermore, while the Borough failed to refer
to the tax act in the body of the tax, it did state the tax act as the
authority for the tax in the advertisement sent to the taxpayers. 
70
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced the issue of man-
datory versus directory statutes in Francis v. Corleto,71 the court
relied upon the precedent established in Pleasant Hills. 72 Francis
involved a mandamus action brought by former employees of the
city of Philadelphia, discharged for alleged misconduct and crimi-
nal acts. 73 The plaintiffs argued that, under the city's Civil Ser-
vice Regulations and the Retirement System Ordinance, the city
was required to remit terminal vacation pay and payments made
to a pension fund. 74 To determine whether mandamus was ap-
propriate to compel action by the city, the court had to decide
whether the city had a mandatory duty to pay the withheld
sums. 75 In regard to the terminal vacation pay, the plaintiffs re-
lied upon the use of the word "shall" in the Civil Service Regula-
tion to indicate that the city was obligated to repay such money
upon termination. 76 Essentially, the city had denied payment of
these funds by off-setting the amount due by claims held by the
city against the former employees. 77 The court, as in Pleasant
Hills, interpreted the word "shall" in compliance with what the
city council had intended when adopting the regulations. 78 Thus,
the Pleasant Hills and Francis courts adhered to the rule that,
68. Id. at 469.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 468. The court stated:
Both mandatory and directory provisions of the legislature are meant to be fol-
lowed. It is only in the effect of non-compliance that a distinction arises. A
provision is mandatory when failure to follow it renders the proceedings to
which it relates illegal and void; it is directory when the failure to follow it does
not invalidate the proceedings.
Id. at 469.
71. 211 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1965).
72. Francis, 211 A.2d at 509.
73. Id. at 504-05.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 506.
76. Id. at 508-09.
77. Francis, 211 A.2d at 506.
78. Id. at 509. The court stated: "[u]nder the circumstances here presented, we will not
construe the word in its mandatory sense .... It would be incredible to hold ... that such
result was intended or would have been countenanced by City Council in adopting the civil
service regulations." Id.
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while "shall" was generally interpreted as mandatory, a court
should focus on legislative intent to decide whether a statute was
mandatory or directory.
79
Just as many other states have done, Pennsylvania has codified
rules of statutory construction to aid courts faced with these is-
sues-such as whether a statutory provision is mandatory or di-
rectory.80 The Pennsylvania legislature first adopted the Statu-
tory Construction Act 8 ' in 1937, and reenacted it in 1972 with
slight modifications.8 2 The Statutory Construction Act of 1972, as
it is known, states that a court must adhere to the Act's rules
unless doing so would render a result different than that intended
by the legislature.8 3 In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ref-
erenced this Act when interpreting the word "shall" in the Chance-
ford case. 
84
The 1989 case of Coretsky v. Board of Commissioners,8 5 dis-
played how the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 changed the
manner in which Pennsylvania courts handled whether a statute
is mandatory or directory. 6 In Coretsky, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court used the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 to decide
whether a provision of the Municipalities Planning Code man-
dated government agencies to cite to a statute or ordinance provi-
sion if they rejected a subdivision application.8 7 The plain lan-
guage of the provisions in question expressly stated the word
"shall," and the parties' arguments centered on the interpretation
of the word "shall" as mandatory or directory.88 In deciding the
correct interpretation of "shall," the court cited the Statutory Con-
struction Act of 1972, specifically noting that decisions on the leg-
islature's intent should only be made when the words of a statute
are unclear.8 9 Since the court found the words of the provision in
79. Id.
80. 3 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 18:2 (4th ed. 1996).
81. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1991 (West 2008).
82. YOUNG, supra note 80, § 18:2.
83. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1901 (West 2008). Section 1901 provides: "[i]n the con-
struction of the statutes of this Commonwealth, the rules set forth in this chapter shall be
observed, unless the application of such rules would result in a construction inconsistent
with the manifest intent of the General Assembly." Id.
84. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.
85. 555 A.2d 72 (Pa. 1989).
86. Coretsky, 555 A.2d at 74.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 73-74.
89. Id. The court cited 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (West 2008), which provides:




question clear, the majority used the common definition of the
word "shall" to hold that the Municipalities Planning Code man-
dated a governing agency that rejected a subdivision plan to cite to
the ordinance upon which that governing agency relied.90
In Modern Trash Removal v. Department of Environmental Re-
sources,91 the court depicted the post-1972 change by expressly
noting distinctions between the current and past precedents.
92
The Modern Trash case concerned whether the Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act 93 (Waste Act) man-
dated the payment of certain fees by a land-fill owner under all
circumstances, free from exception. 94 When the Environmental
Hearing Board ordered the landfill owner to pay the fees, it relied
upon the holding of Coretsky.95 On appeal to the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania, the landfill owner argued that the Francis
opinion controlled, and application of the precedent used in Fran-
cis bolstered the notion that the provision of fees was merely di-
rectory. 96 The court disagreed and refused to follow Francis, stat-
ing that the Statutory Construction Act determined the applicable
law for statutory construction. 97 Under the Statutory Construc-
tion Act, a court may consider the legislature's intent only when
the words of a statute are unclear and ambiguous. 98 Therefore,
after finding the words of the Waste Act clear, the court inter-
preted "shall" according to its general, mandatory meaning. 99
The decisions prior to Modern Trash provided the basis for de-
ciding the later cases cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
the Chanceford case. 100 One such case, Oberneder v. Link Com-
puter Corporation,10 1 which followed Modern Trash, was cited by
the Chanceford court when setting forth its rules of statutory con-
90. Coretsky, 555 A.2d at 74. The majority opinion provides: "[glenerally, words are
construed to mean their common usage. By definition, 'shall' is mandatory. Accordingly,
there is no latitude for overlooking the plain meaning of [the provision] to reach a more
desired result." Id. (citation omitted).
91. 615 A.2d 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
92. Modern Trash, 615 A.2d at 826.
93. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 4000.101-4000.1904 (West 1997 & Supp. 2008).
94. Modern Trash, 615 A.2d. at 825.
95. Id. at 826.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court stated: "[iun Francis, our Supreme Court referred to the intention of
the legislature when construing the word shall .... Francis, however, was decided before
the enactment of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 .... " Id.
98. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 2008).
99. Modern Trash, 615 A.2d at 826.
100. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.
101. 696A.2d 148 (Pa. 1997).
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struction10 2 Oberneder determined whether the Wage Payment
and Collection Law 10 3 mandated an award of attorney's fees to an
employee prevailing in his suit under the statute.10 4 Link Com-
puter Corporation asserted that the trial court erred in granting
attorneys' fees to its former employee, reasoning that the law's
provision providing for attorneys' fees was merely discretionary. 
0 5
While the Francis holding provided the basis for Link's argument,
the court relied upon the Statutory Construction Act and Coretsky,
making reference to Modern Trash as well. 10 6 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, repeating the definition of "shall" stated in Coret-
sky, 10 7 held that an award of attorneys' fees to an employee pre-
vailing in a Wage Payment and Collection Law suit was manda-
tory. 108
The precedent upheld in Oberneder underwent some short-lived
alterations in Gardner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
(Genesis Health Ventures). 109 In Gardner, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania determined the mandatory nature of a provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act setting forth a time restraint on
when an insurer may request an injured employee to complete an
impairment rating evaluation (IRE).110 The results of the IRE
determine whether an injured employee will receive total or par-
tial disability compensation benefits.' When interpreting the
statutory provision, the court noted that its determination rested
102. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.
103. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.1-260.12 (West 1992), which provides: "[t]he court in
any action brought under this section shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable attorneys' fees of any nature to be paid by
the defendant." Id. § 260.9a(f).
104. Oberneder, 696 A.2d at 148.
105. Id. at 150.
106. Id. The court asserted: "[a]ppellants rely upon Francis for the proposition that
shall may be merely directory depending upon the legislature's intent. Francis however,
was decided before the enactment of the Statutory Construction Act, which dictates that
legislative intent is considered only when a statute is ambiguous." Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. The court stated: "[bly definition, shall is mandatory. Accordingly, there is no
room to overlook the statute's plain language to reach a different result." Id. (citing Coret-
sky, 555 A.2d at 74.).
108. Id. at 151.
109. 888 A.2d 758, 764-65 (Pa. 2005).
110. Gardner, 888 A.2d at 759. The statutory provision in question states:
When an employee has received total disability compensation pursuant to
clause (a) for a period of one hundred four weeks, unless otherwise agreed to,
the employee shall be required to submit to a medical examination which shall
be requested by the insurer within sixty days upon the expiration of the one
hundred four weeks to determine the degree of impairment due to the com-
pensable injury ....
77 PA. STAT. ANN § 511.2(1) (West 2002).
111. Gardner, 888 A.2d at 759.
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on the word "shall," and while the general rule provides that
"shall" by definition is mandatory, the word has also been inter-
preted to be merely directory. 112 After explaining the dual nature
of the word "shall," the court concluded that the word was not free
from ambiguity, 113 and proceeded under the authority of the
Statutory Construction Act to inquire into the legislative intent. 114
The court ultimately interpreted the use of the word "shall" in the
specified provision of the Workers' Compensation Act as manda-
tory. 115
In Gardner, Justice Nigro filed a concurring opinion, agreeing
with the interpretation of the term "shall" as mandatory when
used in the Workers' Compensation Act, yet disagreeing with the
majority's finding that the meaning of "shall" was ambiguous. 1
16
Referring to Oberneder,117 Justice Nigro reasserted that "shall"
denoted a legislative mandate, and therefore viewed the majority's
divergence into the legislative intent of the statute unnecessary. 11
8
The Chanceford court cited to Gardner when establishing its
rules of statutory construction. 119 While the court realized that
"shall" has both a mandatory and a discretionary interpretation,
the court did not express the same sentiments as the Gardner ma-
jority-specifically that the word "shall" itself was ambiguous.
120
Rather, the Chanceford majority viewed Gardner as standing for
the proposition that the context in which "shall" is used, rather
than the word itself, may create ambiguity. 121
Koken v. Reliance Insurance Co., 122 decided a year before
Chanceford, provides more insight into the rules used by the
Chanceford court.123 The Koken court faced the issue of whether
112. Id. at 764-65 (citing Commonwealth v. Baker, 690 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997)).
113. Id. at 765. The court stated:
[We must construe the terms of a statute according to their common and ap-
proved usage. Given that this court has found 'shall' to be susceptible to dia-
metrically opposed interpretations, we cannot conclude that the term . . . is so




115. Id. at 765-66.
116. Gardner, 888 A.2d at 768 (Nigro, J., concurring).
117. Oberneder, 696 A.2d 148.
118. Gardner, 888 A.2d at 768 (Nigro J., concurring).
119. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 893 A.2d 70 (Pa. 2006).
123. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104. When identifying the pertinent rules of statutory
construction, the court stated: "[tihis Court... has recognized that the term shall is man-
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the Pennsylvania Insurance Department Act 124 permits a third
party proof of claim to be withdrawn. 125 To correctly interpret
"shall" as mandatory or directory, the Koken court cited to various
past cases, including Oberneder and Coretsky.126 Noticeably miss-
ing from the list of precedents was the Gardner rule-that "shall"
by definition is ambiguous. 127 Rejecting the argument of ambigu-
ity in the statute, the court interpreted "shall" in accordance with
its plain mandatory meaning. 12
8
The cases examined and cited by the court in Chanceford ex-
press the general rule that "shall" denotes a mandate, except in
situations where the context in which the word appears creates
ambiguity. 129 These cases also stand for the principle that a court,
when interpreting a statute, must follow the guidelines estab-
lished by the Statutory Construction Act, which provides for a
close examination of statutory language and an inquiry into the
legislature's intent only if the language is ambiguous. The close
adherence to this foundational groundwork shows that the
Chanceford court took the correct approach in construing the
words of AZA.
In accordance with the approach of the prior cited cases, the
court scrutinized the language of the act, individually examining
the three sentences embodied in section 5912(a). 130 After each
sentence, the court explained the clear meaning of that state-
ment. 131 By taking the pertinent section line by line, the court
dispelled the assertions that the language created ambiguity.
datory for purposes of statutory construction when a statute is unambiguous." Id. (citing
Koken, 893 A.2d at 81.).
124. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 221.1-222.63 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008). The statute in ques-
tion states:
Whenever any third party asserts a cause of action against an insured of an in-
surer in liquidation the third party may file a claim with the liquidator. The
filing of the claim shall operate as a release of the insured's liability to the
third party on that cause of action ....
40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 221.40(a) (West 1999).
125. Koken, 893 A.2d at 73.
126. Id. at 81.
127. Id. Furthermore, the court stated: "[iut is only when the words of the statute are
not explicit that the court should seek to determine the General Assembly's intent through
consideration of statutory construction factors." Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1922(1) (West 2008)).
128. Koken,893 A.2d at 82. Explaining its determination of "shall," the majority wrote:
"[w]here it is unambiguous, the plain language controls, and it cannot be ignored in pursuit
of the statute's alleged contrary spirit or purpose." Id.
129. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104.




The first line of the section,132 with the use of the word "shall,"
provides a clear mandate for the purpose of preventing the crea-
tion of airport hazards. 133 The second sentence, 134 featuring the
word "may," describes what may be included in an ordinance in
compliance with AZA. Although the first sentence contained
"shall," while the second sentence stated "may," the court found
these provisions of AZA clear and free from ambiguity.135 While
the first sentence orders a municipality to enact an airport hazard
zoning ordinance, the second sentence prescribes ways in which
that goal may be achieved. 136 Thus, AZA permits Chanceford
Township some discretion when adopting an airport hazard area
ordinance. Although discretion may be used to decide what the
ordinance may encompass, the third sentence of section 5912(a)
reiterates that the hazard area ordinance must be adopted if an
existing ordinance does not regulate land uses and heights on
lands adjacent to a public airport. 1
37
Each of the five justices taking part in the Chanceford decision
agreed that the commonwealth court erred in interpreting AZA's
use of "shall" as discretionary. 138 While Justice Saylor filed a dis-
senting opinion, the basis of his opinion was his belief that the
existing township ordinance complied with the act. 139 Justice Say-
132. 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912(a) (West 1993). The first sentence provides:
In order to prevent the creation or establishment of airport hazards, every mu-
nicipality having an airport hazard area within its territorial limits shall
adopt, administer and enforce, under the police power and in the manner and
upon the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and in applicable zoning law
unless clearly inconsistent with this subchapter, airport zoning regulations for
such airport hazard area.
Id.
133. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1105.
134. 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912(a) (West 1993). The second sentence provides:
"[tihe regulations may divide the area into zones and, within the zones, specify the land
uses permitted and regulate and restrict the height to which structures may be erected or
objects of natural growth may be allowed to grow." Id.
135. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1106.
136. 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912(a) (West 1993).
137. Id. The final sentence of this section states:
A municipality which includes an airport hazard area created by the location of
a public airport is required to adopt, administer and enforce zoning ordinances
pursuant to this subchapter if the existing comprehensive zoning ordinance...
does not provide for the land uses permitted and regulate and restrict the
height to which structures may be erected or objects of natural growth may be
allowed to grow in an airport hazard area.
Id.
138. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1109. Justice Eakin's majority opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, and Justice Baer. Id.
139. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1109 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
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lor supported the majority's decision that AZA is mandatory,
showing that the correct decision was reached. 140
The most striking aspect of this court's determination lies not in
the holding itself, but in its consequences. Both the appellate
brief of the Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors and the
amicus curiae brief of the PSATS focus on the negative repercus-
sions that a mandatory interpretation would bear. 141 The Board
of Supervisors argued that thousands of acres of privately owned
land would be subjected to restrictions for the sole benefit of a
five-acre airport functioning as a non-conforming use. 142 Addi-
tionally, they asserted that these consequences would burden mu-
nicipalities throughout the entire state. 143 The trial testimony of a
PennDOT expert revealed that approximately eighty percent of
municipalities containing public airports did not have airport haz-
ard zoning. 1
44
The Board of Supervisors and PSATS also argued that compel-
ling the adoption of airport hazard zoning ordinances would bear
constitutional repercussions in the form of de facto takings.
145 If
AZA mandated the adoption of an ordinance, the restrictions im-
posed would interfere with the use and enjoyment of private land,
and force municipalities to compensate the affected landowners. 1
46
Chanceford Aviation rebutted this assertion with its own public
policy argument, contending the legislature intended to benefit
the public by establishing the safety provisions embodied in
AZA.147 Furthermore, the legislature decided that these benefits
would be provided through public expense. 14
8
140. Id.
141. Brief of Appellee at 13, Chanceford, 923 A.2d 1099, 2005 WL 3862607. Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania State Ass'n of Township Supervisors, in Support of Appellee
Township at 9-10, Chanceford, 923 A.2d 1099 (No. 2003-Su-003232-Y08).
142. Brief of Appellee at 12, Chanceford, 923 A.2d 1099, 2005 WL 3862607.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 13. A "de facto taking" is defined as "interference with the use or value or
marketability of land in anticipation of condemnation, depriving the owner of reasonable
use and thereby triggering the obligation to pay just compensation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1218 (8th ed. 2005).
146. Brief of Appellee at 13, Chanceford, 923 A.2d 1099, 2005 WL 3862607; Brief of Pa.
State Ass'n of Twp. Supervisors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee Township at 9-10,
Chanceford, 923 A.2d 1099 (No. 2003-Su-003232-Y08). Several States have held that ordi-
nances limiting building and tree heights on land adjacent to an airport constitute a regu-
latory taking and require just compensation under the Federal and State Constitutions.
See McCarran Intern. Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2006).





On appeal from the trial court, the commonwealth court clearly
found persuasive the aforementioned negative consequences. 149 In
stating its holding, the court made direct reference to the reper-
cussions, and expressly refused to find that the legislature could
have intended such results. 150 The question remains whether
these consequences should have played a role in the supreme
court's decision in this case.
Under the Statutory Construction Act, the intention of the legis-
lature may be ascertained if the court determines that the words
of the statute are unclear or ambiguous. 151 If the court had fo-
cused on the possible negative consequences, this statutory guide-
line would have been ignored. Once the court determined that the
language of AZA was clear and unambiguous, the court lacked the
authority to give weight to the negative repercussions. Clear lan-
guage, defined according to its common usage, is the best indica-
tion of legislative intent. 152 Furthermore, the fact that a mere
five-acre parcel of land will be benefited does not affect the clear
language of AZA.
That the Chanceford case became a debate of public policy
should not distract from the issue presented to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. The Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors
did not pose a question challenging the constitutional validity of
AZA. Rather, the question to be answered was one of statutory
interpretation, requiring close adherence to the codified rules of
the Statutory Construction Act. Although the holding may burden
private landowners and municipalities throughout the State, the
approach taken and ultimate conclusion correctly followed the
long line of applicable precedent.
Tiffany M. Malkoski
149. Baublitz v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 865 A.2d 975, 978-79 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005).
150. Baublitz, 865 A.2d at 979. The court stated: "we cannot conclude that the legisla-
ture .. . intended that the AZA mandate that the Township adopt a model airport hazard
zoning ordinance that will result in a servitude being imposed on the properties of hun-
dreds of landowners and thousands of acres.... ." Id.
151. 1 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (West 2008).
152. Chanceford, 923 A.2d at 1104 (citing Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers' Comp. Appeal
Bd., 834 A.2d 524, 531 (Pa. 2003)).
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